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ABSTRACT
The increased use of sustainability standards in the international trade in cocoa
challenges companies to find effective modes of service delivery to large numbers
of small-scale farmers. A case study of the Sustainable Tree Crops Program
targeting the small-scale cocoa producers in Côte d’Ivoire supplying international
commodity markets shifts attention from mechanisms of private governance to the
embedding of service delivery in the institutional dynamics of the state. It
demonstrates that, despite a recent history of violent conflict and civil unrest, the
introduced Farmer Field Schools programme achieved a surprising scale in terms of
numbers and geographical spread. The analysis of this outcome combines political
science and anthropological studies of effective and developmental elements in the
state with the interest in institutional work found in organization science. The
scaling of a new form of service delivery is explained by the skilful practices of
institutional work by managers of a public–private partnership. They have been
professionally associated with the sector for a long time and had the capacity to
embed new forms of service delivery in persistent pockets of bureaucratic
effectiveness in a failed state.
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At the beginning of the new millennium, the cocoa
sector in Côte d’Ivoire, its cocoa organizations and
the country itself could not have had a worse repu-
tation. In 2001, reports of a ‘child slave ship’ in
trouble off Africa’s west coast (Lamb, 2001) sparked
allegations of child slavery on cocoa plantations,
causing an international outcry. By 2002, the country
had entered another period of violent conflict and
economic crisis, and in the following years, funds des-
tined for cocoa farmers were used to fuel the fighting
(Klaas, 2008). In 2005, the country ranked highest on
the ‘Failed States Index’ (FFP, 2014) and political
elites maintained their status quo in the cocoa
sector (Woods, 2007). Côte d’Ivoire was generally con-
sidered, under the rule of President Gbagbo, to be a
failed state with clearly predatory traits.
This context seems not very conducive for endea-
vours to implement sustainability standards for
cocoa and the related new forms of service delivery
to large numbers of small-scale cocoa farmers. Never-
theless, a public–private partnership (PPP) programme
targeting cocoa farmers was able to organize a
growing number of Farmer Field Schools (FFS), and
consequentially reach a substantial number of small-
holder cocoa farmers and even transform a top-
down extension approach into a participatory discov-
ery learning approach. Alignment of the PPP with the
Ivorian extension system and the mobilization of
unprecedented national and international private
sector support appear as crucial preconditions for
this outcome. This reflects a puzzling outcome when
seen in the light of the discussion on failed states:
what generated this scalable form of service delivery
in a context that appears unconducive?
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For explaining the observed transformation and
scaling of service delivery to small-scale cocoa
farmers in Côte d’Ivoire, this paper investigates the
sequence of activities set in motion by the career pro-
fessionals managing the Sustainable Tree Crops Pro-
gramme (STCP), a regional PPP programme in West
Africa (2001–2011). STCP introduced the FFS method
and connected it with the ongoing reform process
of the public agricultural extension infrastructure in
the country. The analysis of the specific case of
scaling FFS in Côte d’Ivoire aims at tracing pathways
through which project or company-based sustainabil-
ity initiatives merge with the continuously reproduced
and gradually transformed modes of operation of
specialized groups of career professionals within the
state bureaucracy.
The case study central to this paper addresses the
question of how the practices and strategies of career
professionals, both within and close to the bureaucracy,
generated the scaling of a novel form of delivering
extension services. Instead of looking at the state as
an unwieldy vehicle, the paper focuses on functional
units within the state. Analysing this connection
made between the practices of PPP management and
the institutions in the cocoa sector may offer clues to
how effective and scalable transition strategies
towards agricultural and rural sustainability are
brought about.
Understanding how FFS, a new bottom-up form of
service delivery and knowledge exchange, reaches
large numbers of smallholder cocoa farmers is rel-
evant for various sustainability initiatives. Today, the
private sector has a leading role in these initiatives,
often in partnerships with NGOs and international
development agencies. Apart from addressing the
issue of child labour in cocoa farming, such partner-
ships usually concentrate on training producers and
ensuring compliance with sustainability standards
(Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012). However, in stra-
tegic sectors such as the cocoa economy in Côte
d’Ivoire or Ghana, the public sector will be part of
these sustainability initiatives, anchored in the
private sector and civil society (Vellema, Laven, Ton,
& Muilerman, 2016). Hence, it is important to explore
in what ways the public sector accommodates or
adjusts to these private initiatives and what this
implies for the embedding of global standards in
locally established modes of partnering (Vellema &
van Wijk, 2015).
The FFS approach promoted by STCP in Côte
d’Ivoire was not new, but it was innovative for cocoa
in West Africa, offering a nine-month-long training
not on a food crop but on a perennial crop. A success-
ful small-scale initial experience in Indonesia led to the
co-designing and piloting of the cocoa FFS approach
in Central and West Africa in collaboration with the
national research and extension institutions. In con-
trast to the classic transfer-of-technology approaches,
cocoa FFS showedmeasurable impact on farmers’ pro-
ductive capacity (Gockowski, Asamoah, David, Gyamfi,
& Kumi, 2010). FFS entails a shift from abstract, aca-
demic, specialized and slow-to-change knowledge
production to more localized multidisciplinary knowl-
edge production in a context of application (Gibbons
et al., 1994; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001, 2003).
FFS is focused on locally adapted participatory, flexible
knowledge production by groups of smallholder
farmers, and can be translated differently by actors
manoeuvring in the context of institutional change
(Sherwood, Schut, & Leeuwis, 2012).
The paper starts by explaining the design of the
case study and our conceptual lens. Next, it describes
the context of the introduction of STCP FFS and pre-
sents the outcomes in terms of achieved scale of
novel modes of service delivery (e.g. Nowotny, Scott,
& Gibbons, 2003; Wigboldus & Leeuwis, 2013). The
analysis detects four plausible processes generating
the scaling of FFS in the specific context of Côte
d’Ivoire. By offering a more contextual assessment of
the outcomes of induced modes of service delivery
to small-scale farmers, the paper adds to the emerging
area of research on the African state and the dynamics
of its bureaucracies. The discussion builds on Booth
et al. (2015) who argue that not compliance with
‘good governance’ principles, but rather a deep under-
standing of the functioning of regimes explains differ-
ences in development performance. A combination of
the concepts of ‘institutional work’ found in organiz-
ation science (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Lawr-
ence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) and ‘pockets of
effectiveness’ used in political science as well as
anthropological studies of effective and developmen-
tal elements in the state (Bierschenk, 2010; Bierschenk
& de Sardan, 2014; Roll, 2011, 2014) is proposed to
unravel the situated processes of diffusion and scaling.
Methods
Data collection
The case study central to this paper documents and
analyses the sequence of events and organizational
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actions contributing to the scaling of FFS in Côte
d’Ivoire. The STCP partnership was considered to
have pioneered the cocoa FFS approach in West
Africa. The implementing partners themselves, includ-
ing the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
(IITA), recognized the need to learn from the experi-
ence (STCP, 2009, p. 23).
Main data sources were project documents,
internal discussion papers, Memoranda of Under-
standing and contracts between STCP and partner
organizations, compiled from the archives. From this
broad set, 24 key documents (mainly annual reports,
newsletters, programme overview papers, pilot and
transition reports and progress reports) were selected
for in-depth analysis of the scaling process. Key stat-
istics came from the partnership’s M&E and training
databases, and from financial administration.
For further insight, additional qualitative data were
collected through in-depth, semi-structured (group)
interviews in June 2010, one year before STCP
became defunct. Interviews purposely targeted
specific high-level officials in government institutions
Agence Nationale d’Appui au Développement Rural
(ANADER) and Fond Interprofessionel pour la
Recherche et le Conseil Agricoles (FIRCA); the
ANADER staff operating within STCP; partner coopera-
tive and NGO staff; STCP management staff at the
national and regional levels; and a local FFS project
expert. Field research at the cooperative level in
Côte d’Ivoire was limited to the Abengourou area
owing to the continued socio-political crisis, unrest
and insecurity.
Short follow-up interviews were held with partner-
ship staff over the course of 2010 and 2011. Interviews
were recorded and transcribed and an initial synthesis
was shared with the STCP’s country manager for vali-
dation and for guidance on additional sources to cor-
roborate data.
Data analysis
The data were analysed through inductive content
and discourse analysis focussing on interactions,
courses of events and the evolving interactions
among partners. This was done after STCP ended
and all of its IITA-affiliated management moved on
in their careers. Figure 1 presents the conceptual fra-
mework used for analysing the management inter-
actions within the PPP, and interactions of the
proposed strategic intervention (FFS) with specific
groups of state bureaucrats, functioning in an uncon-
ducive institutional and socio-political context, aiming
to achieve effective public service delivery.
Limitations of the study
The principal researcher was externally recruited, but
undeniably linked with STCP’s key partner IITA. This
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for analysing the management of interactions within and across the boundaries of the PPP.
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may have affected the perceptions and expectations
of interviewees. Also, due to the retrospective nature
of the study and – for the interviews – a dependence
on informants’ memory, some details and interpret-
ations related to decision-making are likely to be
missing or skewed by hindsight. At the same time,
this is inevitable when the study aims to look
through the eyes of the key actors to understand its
outcome. The research documented on specific prac-
tices of career professional managing interactions
within the partnership and the state bureaucracy,
reported in reviewed documents and observed by
respondents, in order to understand a specific
outcome: the number and spread of FFS. The research
did not assess key respondents’ backgrounds or their
actual practised norms and values (including levels of
personal and fiscal integrity).
Results – a case study of scaling extension
models and service delivery in Côte d’Ivoire
Public programmes on service delivery in cocoa
From around 1999, governments in West Africa, their
partners in development and the global chocolate
industry committed to developing a healthier and
more responsible cocoa value chain (Shapiro & Rosen-
quist, 2004). The realization that increases in yields
could play a significant role in the fight against
poverty was reinforced by international consumer,
media (Hawksley, 2001) and political pressure,
especially on the eradication of (the worst forms of)
child labour and by upcoming certification schemes
focused on social and environmental sustainability. A
key constraint to achieving success in this area was
the near absence of agricultural extension and the
ineffectiveness of service delivery. An STCP baseline
(Kouadjo, Keho, Mosso, & Toutou, 2002) showed that
in 2001, only 19% of Ivorian cocoa farmers had been
in contact with a government extension agent
within a period of three months.
In an attempt to address the weak cocoa extension
infrastructure in West Africa, STCP was launched in
2000. Conceived as a PPP, STCP was predominantly
funded by the global chocolate industry, represented
by the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) and the United
States Agency for International Development; it was
hosted by IITA and operationally supported by the
national governments of Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia. Over the course of a
couple of years, the programme adapted, tested and
validated the FFS method for training cocoa farmers
on integrated crop and pest management (Asare &
David, 2011; David & Cobbah, 2008).
A country manager and technical field staff were
responsible for the programme’s direction and
embedding in each country. Bitzer et al. (2012)
describe how, by 2010, STCP had turned into a
regional hub coordinating many of the partnerships
active in West Africa. It served as a platform for tech-
nology dissemination and research and concentrated
resources and expertise on farmers’ training.
Through access to its country-level infrastructure and
institutional network, STCP took up a broker’s function
among researchers, local communities, donors and
companies. The expectation was that the pro-
gramme’s brokerage would sustain the mode of
service provision and create leverage, resulting in
more partnerships being established and more
resources invested (STCP, 2010a, pp. 10–13).
The case study of the scaling of STCP FFS in Côte
d’Ivoire first describes the context wherein this took
place. It then presents the outreach and scale of the
STCP programme and later of the service provision
by the public agricultural extension agency, ANADER,
and introduces the different groups within the cocoa
bureaucracy. Next, it maps the connections between
the intervention programme and the particular
context in Côte d’Ivoire.
Context: state reform and conflict
After independence, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a
period of stability and economic success aided by an
extensive bureaucracy based on a network of political
patronage (Bonjean & Chambas, 2001), the increas-
ingly important export of cash crops, mainly cocoa,
and foreign investments (Boone, 2007; Romani,
2003). After the 1960s, for nearly 30 years, cocoa pro-
duction developed with a central role for the Caisse de
Stabilisation et de Soutien des Produits Primaires Agri-
coles (CAISTAB), with roles including external commer-
cialization and the assurance of price stability for
cocoa producers.
In the 1980s and 1990s, this ‘Ivorian miracle’ was
affected by fluctuations in the international commod-
ity markets and the imposed structural adjustment
programmes deregulating the cocoa sector (Gilbert,
2009; Grossman-Greene & Bayer, 2009; Ruf, 2009).
Boone (2007) shows that the break-up of state
control over the cocoa export circuit created spatially
dispersed points of corruption, private accumulation
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and even political mobilization all along the coffee–
cocoa marketing network across southern Côte
d’Ivoire. Towards the end of the 1990s, the political
situation became unstable. This had already started
in 1993 after the death of Houphouët Boigny, the
long-reigning president, and culminated in protracted
political turmoil with an ethno-nationalistic character.
Finally, a coup d’état in 1999 created deep ethno-pol-
itical divisions in society (Daddieh, 2001; Mitchell,
2012). A series of manipulated elections, widespread
protests and a failed attempt at a coup in 2002
resulted in a civil war with ties to conflicts in Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone and split the country along
ethno-regional lines in 2003 (Chauveau & Richards,
2008; ICG, 2010). When, in 2007, a peace was brokered,
the agreement did not address the root causes of the
conflict (Ayangafac, 2007). These tensions resurfaced
during the tumultuous 2011 presidential elections, in
which Laurent Gbagbo refused to admit defeat and
finally was arrested and sent to the International Crim-
inal Court in The Hague.
In 1999, the World Bank withdrew its funding for
the national agricultural research and extension insti-
tutions Centre National de Research Agronomique
(CNRA) and ANADER (Stads & Doumbia, 2010). A
myriad of newly emerging or provisional regulatory
agencies and service delivery organizations in the
cocoa sector created competition distortions and
added administrative charges (Bonjean & Chambas,
2001; Gilbert, 2009). Transnational companies, sup-
ported by fiscal incentives, increasingly influenced
the dynamics in the sector at the expense of national
exporters. The sector was ill-equipped to deal with
hard-bargaining commodity buyers; cocoa farmers
were additionally levied through the system installed
by the central Ivorian government to collect taxes
(Gilbert, 2009; Grossman-Greene & Bayer, 2009; Ruf,
2009). The public sector and politicians were notorious
for their lack of transparency and for misappropriation
(Dévérin, 2006; GlobalWitness, 2007; ICG, 2009). Ayan-
gafac (2007) emphasizes that the crisis needs to be
understood as a struggle for control over the insti-
tutions that distribute resources, most notably,
cocoa. These political developments shaped the con-
ditions for service delivery and thus for the STCP
programme.
Outreach and scale of service delivery
In this context of Côte d’Ivoire, with political turmoil,
violent conflict and a failed state with clearly
predatory traits, it seemed unlikely that STCP would
achieve its targeted outcomes in terms of the
numbers of FFS organized and farmers reach and sim-
ultaneously achieve an exit strategy that would mate-
rialize in public and private actors taking over the new
mode of service delivery. Ten years later, contrary to
this initial expectation, ANADER, Côte d’Ivoire’s
public agricultural extension organization, reported
that 879 FFS had been organized in the 2011/2012
cocoa season (ANADER, 2013) directly after STCP
stepped back, using national and international
private sector support (Figure 2). By 2010, the pro-
gramme reached more smallholders in Côte d’Ivoire
with FFS than in three other West African countries
combined (Figure 3). If we take a realistic average
number of about 30 participants for a cocoa FFS in
Côte d’Ivoire (Muilerman & David, 2011), this reported
figure would mean that approximately 26,000 people
graduated from cocoa FFS in 2011/2012, or roughly 3–
4% of the estimated 600–900,000 cocoa smallholders
(Ingram et al., 2014).
STCP temporarily halted activities on the ground
after another episode of socio-political instability and
violence in early 2011, though work continued into
2012 (STCP, 2011a). However, during this time,
ANADER led the organization of FFS, which took off
in a great flight under the national ‘Quantity, Quality
and Growth Programme’ (2QC) (STCP, 2011c). The
private sector and international donors increasingly
aligned with 2QC in collaboration with the fully over-
hauled national cocoa institutions now managed by
the Comité de Gestion de la Filière Café Cacao’s
(CGFCC) successor, the Comité Café Cacao (CCC) in
which the former STCP country manager today fills a
key position (STCP, 2011b).
Besides ANADER, the public agency for extension,
the private sector contributed significantly to the dif-
fusion of FFS. According to the PPP’s annual reports,
initially, the private sector’s initiatives under the PPP
focused on the training of FFS facilitators coming
from cocoa cooperatives (63%) or communities
(33%) and did not focus on those from ANADER (2%)
or NGOs (2%) (STCP, 2010b). Eventually, it was
mainly through independent national funding
awarded to the PPP that the number of ANADER
agents trained on cocoa FFS tripled to around 200,
thus allowing for collaboration at scale (STCP, 2010b).
From the interviews, it emerges that especially
towards the end of the PPP programme, ANADER
increasingly moved into the driver’s seat, despite the
fact that these semi-privatized bureaucrats were part
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of what can be called a dysfunctional state apparatus.
By 2010, the FFS had taken off on a large scale and also
continued to grow after 2011 when STCP became
defunct in Côte d’Ivoire. The private sector kept up
its collaboration with ANADER and built on new initiat-
ives such as the WCF’s Cocoa Livelihoods Program
(CLP) (Figure 2). This outcome for FFS in Côte
d’Ivoire is even more striking if we consider the chal-
lenging socio-political and institutional context
under the reign of President Laurent Gbagbo (2000–
2011). During the electoral crisis of 2011, even
ANADER’s headquarters in Abidjan were pillaged,
reported ANADER-seconded STCP staff. The work in
2012, ‘happened in an appeased socio-political
context which favoured a good working climate’
(ANADER, 2013, p. 4, author’s translation), although
Ruf, Bourgeois, Kiendré, and Bebo (2014) point to a
lack of capacity within ANADER and CLP after the
departure of IITA in 2011.
Since the end of the STCP programme in 2011, Côte
d’Ivoire’s regulatory cocoa organizations have become
more proactive. In 2014, the Ivorian government and
the WCF announced an unprecedented strategy to
accelerate public–private collaboration. According to
Barry Parkin, WCF Chairman and Chief Sustainability
Officer at Mars Inc.:
Figure 3. Number of direct cocoa FFS graduates, per STCP project country, in 2010.
Source: STCP (2010).
Figure 2. Reported number of cocoa FFS in Côte d’Ivoire involving ANADER.
Data source: STCP annual reports 2003–2011 and ANADER annual report (2013).
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This agreement represents one of the most significant
steps the sector is taking to make cocoa sustainable.
(WCF, 2014)
In the following sections, the paper ﬁrst introduces the
central elements of the cocoa bureaucracy that still
existed despite the context of conﬂict and state
reform. Subsequently, it traces the different processes
that deﬁned the interactions of groups of bureaucrats
within the STCP programme, in order to better under-
stand service delivery and the scaling of FFS.
Persistent elements of the cocoa bureaucracy
Four cocoa-related bureaucratic organizations played
a principal role in the process through which the
PPP firmly fixed its approach to service delivery in
the organizational infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire until
2011: ANADER, CNRA, FIRCA and CGFCC.
ANADER and CNRA
Cocoa extension (training, advice and research) in
Côte d’Ivoire has been the mandate of ANADER
and the CNRA. Both were launched in the 1990s
during the reform processes controlled by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
ANADER is the coordinating agency for agricultural
extension and functions as an intermediary
between the national agricultural research centres
(mainly CNRA) and the farmers. Throughout the
country, a large network of agents and agronomists
stayed in villages and provided professional services
to farmers, including the introduction of innovations
and formation of farmers’ groups. (Romani, 2003)
showed how, around 2000, ANADER’s extension
focus and impact were mainly on food crops and
less on coffee and cocoa.
ANADER and CNRA could not work in large parts of
the country in the first decade of the new millennium.
CNRA was heavily affected by the crisis, and today, its
capacity is greatly reduced in comparison to when it
benefitted from World Bank-funded programmes, or
with the research budget of its largest competitor,
Ghana. Today, CNRA is funded directly by the private
sector, through the producer organizations of differ-
ent agricultural value chains, managed by FIRCA
(Stads & Doumbia, 2010).
FIRCA
The FIRCA, established in 2002 (Stads, 2011) but oper-
ational only by 2007/2008, was a milestone in the
restructuring of the research and extension services.
It is essentially a federation of over a dozen associ-
ations from industry including producers and pro-
cessors (Byerlee, 2011) and a financing body for
agricultural research, extension provision and capacity
building of agricultural producers and their pro-
fessional organizations. Not only the state but also
all producers participate financially through pro-
fessional savings schemes per agricultural value chain.
This system is not fully in place for all commodities
and most notably, not for cocoa where funds are pro-
vided through levies on exports (Byerlee, 2011). From
the interviews, it becomes clear that the cocoa oper-
ators and associations are represented in the advisory
body Comité National des Sages (CNS) and in FIRCA’s
General Assembly with representation according to
the importance of the agricultural product and the
funds contributed by that particular value chain. The
associations have a majority vote (73%) in both the
General Assembly and the Executive Board. The
other members are representatives from agro-industry
and academia, with a remaining 5% made up of gov-
ernment officials. At least 75% of the professional
savings mobilized by a specific value chain will be
used to that particular value chain. The rest is princi-
pally dedicated to solidarity with other underdeve-
loped and difficult-to-auto-fund value chains (mainly
of food crops). A percentage is reserved for FIRCA’s
administration (Stads, 2011; Stads & Doumbia, 2010).
Despite its tendency to under-invest in agricultural
research, largely due to its non-exclusive and non-rival
nature (Byerlee, 2011), the private sector has taken
over the role of funding agricultural capacity building,
extension provision and research. It should be noted
that involvement by the private sector has always
been more ‘intimate’ in Côte d’Ivoire than in other
cocoa economies (Vellema et al., 2016). FIRCA’s pro-
fessional savings schemes and innovative funding of
commercial research are unique in Africa (Byerlee,
2011; Ragasa & Byerlee, 2013; Stads, 2011; Stads &
Doumbia, 2010).
CGFCC
In September 2008, President Gbagbo announced
another overhaul of the management of the cocoa
sector with the formation of the provisional CGFCC
(Grossman-Greene & Bayer, 2009). This move,
perhaps surprisingly, lessened direct political control
over the cocoa sector (Gbagbo, 2008b). By the end
of 2011, all the cocoa institutions established since
1999 were united under the permanent CCC, the suc-
cessor to the CGFCC.
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Embedding FFS and service delivery in the
cocoa bureaucracy
This study primarily focuses on the embedding of new
forms of service delivery for an explanation of the
observed scaling, rather than explaining the achieved
scale from the nature of the FFS approach itself. The
scaling of the service delivery introduced by the PPP
co-evolved with institutional reforms in the cocoa
sector in a troubled socio-political context (Table 1).
Deliberately making connections with the bureau-
cratic career professionals in the state appeared to
be an important characteristic of the work of those
managing the PPP. Our conceptual lens and method
of inductive analysis and discourse analysis of the
documents and interviews helped to identify four
emerging purposive actions, which elucidate how
STCP management aligned interventions with the
remaining bureaucratic autonomy in the cocoa
sector. The section that follows traces these actions.
It starts at the farmers’ level and then looks for lin-
kages between the PPP and bureaucrats at the levels
above that of the farmers. These examples of purpo-
sive and situational actions by the PPP unpack the
observed scaling ‘against the odds’ amidst a turbulent
stream of dramatic socio-political developments
within the Ivorian institutional cocoa landscape.
Flexibly modifying extension modalities
The first action reveals flexibility and the willingness
on the part of the PPP to step away from dogmatic
thinking about how higher and lower level extension
staff could link with farmers and their organizations.
The PPP, with its aim of scaling and institutionalizing
a specific approach (FFS) to extension, had to navigate
cautiously between its technical partnership with the
national public extension services and the private
sector-driven demand to reach as many cocoa produ-
cers as fast as possible.
The first entry point in 2003 was working with
cooperatives through an initial partnership with the
NGO Canadian Cooperation Society for International
Development (SOCODEVI), which evacuated that
same year. Unorganized groups of farmers were also
targeted but only within private sector collaborations.
At any rate, according to the PPP’s country manager,
the original idea was certainly not to introduce separ-
ate cooperative extension services.
We are lucky to have a fund that is funded by the
farmers’ organizations, so why should I give another
burden to a farmer to fund extension? (INT04, Abidjan,
07-06-2010)
Although the PPP primarily focused on ANADER
agents, it also experimented with an approach, inno-
vative for Côte d’Ivoire, of engaging farmer-facilitators
or ‘cocoa relay farmers’ (Paysan Relais or PR). Within
FFS, the competent PR functioned as a linchpin
between the ANADER agents and the cooperative
farmers and assured a constant presence and the con-
tinued training of peers. While the incorporation of the
PR in itself was perceived as a success by STCP man-
agement, it proved a formidable hurdle in the relation-
ship with the bureaucratic partners and in going to
scale.
On the one hand, ANADER initially respected the
idea of the PR in the pilot. It observed that the
farmers’ response to FFS was positive and partici-
pation markedly higher than under traditional
approaches. The PPP’s management firmly believed
that ANADER’s rural development agents, or Agents
de Développement Rural (ADR), could never reach
enough producers without village-level support, also
during the scale-up. At the cooperative level,
judging from the interviews, appreciation and social
recompense were high for the PR, but these quickly
felt overburdened and under-remunerated.
On the other hand, ANADER opposed the ‘innova-
tive’ PR system from the start, arguing in the interview
that there would be no sustainable funding available
for it. The PPP’s stance that FIRCA might be
approached only confirmed ANADER’s fears that
national extension funding could be reallocated,
reported ANADER/STCP staff. The PR, better inte-
grated, connected and less hindered by bureaucratic
ego, did have a number of benefits as compared
with the generalist ADR, and their good performance
did indeed undermine the ADR’s position. A good pro-
portion of ADR were less trusted and less participatory;
they often refused or were unable to speak anything
other than French, thus increasing dependence on
the PR. Some cooperative members stated:
They are comical. […] Even our linguistic brothers, who
are agents with ANADER, are not willing to speak the
local language. (INT07, Abengourou, 09-06-2010)
This leads to a peculiar situation, confirmed by a
regional ANADER director:
The ADR and PR work side by side because ANADER can
never reach all the farmers. The national discourse is
different from the regional and local. (INT09, Abengourou,
09-06-2010)
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Table 1. Instructive events in cocoa sector and at the national level.
Year Period Cocoa sector-related event National politics
1994 Before
scaling FFS
ANADER formed out of a number of previous extension bodies. Devaluation of FCFA
Bédié re-elected while opposition boycotts in protest against exclusion of their candidates who are not
100% of Ivorian descent.
1999 Total liberalization of cocoa sector, release cocoa price, liquidation
of CAISTAB.
World Bank pulls out of long-term programmes, drastically reducing
funds ANADER, CNRA.
Transnational companies enter Ivorian markets and strengthen
positions over the next 5 years.
Military coup against Bédié led by Robert Guei.
President Bédié flees to France.
2000 Nouveau CAISTAB restructured and dissolved into ARCC, BCC, FRC,
FDPCC and GFGCCC
Guei proclaims himself president, but flees the country after popular uprising against perceived election
rigging.
Gbagbo proclaimed winner and president. Ouattara, excluded, calls for new election.
Fighting erupts between Gbagbo in (Christian) South and Ouattara in (Muslim) North.
Gbagbo wins parliamentary elections.
2001 Harkin-Engel protocol on eradication of child labour rocks cocoa
sector.
Private sector declares no trust in bureaucracy but STCP decides to
work with them anyway.
Attempted coup fails
Reports of child slave ship off Africa’s west coast. Allegations of child slavery in cocoa cause international
outcry and force the government to take action.
2002 FIRCA ‘created’ (operational in 2007), final step in the restructuring
of extension and research.
Mutiny among demobilized military degenerates into rebellion, leads to civil war. Côte d’Ivoire Patriotic
Movement rebels take control in the North.
2003 FIRCA ‘established’ (operational in 2007) Country virtually split North–South.
Military and rebels declare that war is over.
2004 STCP organizes extensive field visit for FIRCA, ANADER and World
Bank.
First private sector partner demands support from STCP to
collaborate with extension service
Opposition rally against Gbagbo in Abidjan leads to over 100 deaths after violent crackdown, suspected to
be part of planned action by security forces.
UN peacekeeping force deployed.
2005 STCP partners with FIRCA
STCP receives funding from ‘old’ FDPCC
Elections postponed after new law allows Gbagbo to stay in office.
2007 During
scaling FFS
FIRCA decides to award funding to ‘Service Provider’ STCP.
FIRCA operational, ‘old’ funds disappeared, World Bank and
government call pace and result of reform ‘disappointing’.
Former cocoa executives jailed for stealing.
Political Accord of Ouagadougou
President Gbagbo declares war between the North and South is over.
Violence continues.
2008 Gbagbo announces overhaul of cocoa sector management with
formation of CGFCC (and CNS).
Some reduction cocoa taxation.
Start 2QC programme, also based on achievements/design of STCP.
UN renews mandate of 8000 troops.
Presidential elections postponed.
2010 Scaling FFS Private partner in STCP expresses appreciation for working with
national institutions.
Opposition manifestations leave several dead.
Long-awaited presidential elections. First round in October won by Gbagbo (38%), second was Ouattara
(32%). Run-off vote in November. Election Commission declares Ouattara winner, Gbagbo refuses to
accept. Dispute escalates in renewed violence.
2011 STCP closes
MARS moves into RCI with large programme ‘Vision 4 Change’.




























FIRCA supported the PR system only for a short
while, which led to these comments by FIRCA
management:
[The PR] start to look more and more like our agents.
Especially since we give them work and means, we are
deviating a little. They start to show the same behaviour
as the technician. […] We have found the weaknesses.
Now in the second contract [with STCP] we are correcting
them. (INT06, Abidjan, 08/06/2010)
By doing so, FIRCA effectively reoriented the PPP’s
role to backstopping ANADER. The PPP could have
held on to its beliefs but decided to agree to take a
backseat in the process. In the last two years of its
existence, the PPP focused on quality control by its
seconded ANADER staff, increasingly getting less
support for research-driven modes of data collection,
or as FIRCA representative stated:
We don’t need useless theoretical calculations. (INT06,
Abidjan, 08/06/2010)
The country manager of the PPP disagreed:
We need to let the cocoa industry understand that, so
that there will not be any conflict any more. That
means [the industry partners] go directly to ANADER
and make sure that ANADER accepts that we ensure
the quality control. It is the best way for us, it is the
best way also that our efforts are going to be sustainable
and institutionalized. (INT04, Abidjan (07/06/2010)
Eventually the PPP, at the expense of seeking full com-
pliance with the ‘ideal type’ FFS, chose to be accom-
modating, not dogmatic, in order to allow the
bureaucratic cocoa career professional to effectively
align their strategy and mode of working, thereby,
to some extent, retrogressing to classic top-down
approaches (Ruf et al., 2014).
Resisting short-termism and engaging with
national bureaucracy
Secondly, the actions and strategies of the PPP man-
agement showed resistance to a private sector reflex
to concentrate on immediate results and short-term
concerns. Although this created some initial tensions
in the partnership, it opened opportunities for enga-
ging with groups of bureaucratic career professionals.
The PPP programme selected the STCP’s country
manager from the ranks of a national think-tank on
public expenditure. He was deeply embedded in and
knowledgeable about bureaucratic architecture and
procedures. Several respondents point to his previous
involvement in the analysis of the World Bank and
IMF-led reforms of the agricultural sector in the
1990s (STCP, 2003a). This appears to have been a deci-
sive reason for his opposition to the belief that the
failing government institutions should be discounted
as implementing partners. He argued that a long-
term perspective was absolutely necessary and was
in favour of intimate collaboration with the pro-
fessionals within the national bureaucracy. This
course was eventually agreed upon with the private
sector partners. Moreover, in a somewhat desolate
NGO landscape due to the crisis, no operator other
than the semi-privatized ANADER and its 6000
agents could potentially reach substantial numbers
of cocoa producers – a key objective for the private
sector partners.
The national organizations co-invested in the part-
nership (STCP, 2006a, p. 11). ANADER seconded some
senior specialized cocoa agents, or Techniciens Spécial-
isés (TS), at no cost even before the start of STCP, and
with CNRA contributing resource persons. One of the
TS took up the role of Participatory Extension Special-
ist (PES) and became integrated into the PPP manage-
ment team, acting as a linchpin by being active,
diplomatic and communicative. This helped the PPP
to connect proactively with other agencies. All of
this was considered a major task, as explained by
the country manager:
It is not the ANADER facilitators who facilitated the
adoption [of FFS] by [ANADER] Headquarters, it was
the STCP management; meetings, workshops we
invited them to see. We did our job. (INT04, Abidjan,
07/06/2010)
An additional approach, reports the country manager,
was the cautious but ﬁrm refusal to involve regular
extension agents during the ﬁrst phase. With the full
integration of high-level subject matter specialists
(TS), instead of the rural development agents (ADR),
the management of the PPP had two key objectives:
(i) to ensure the proper testing, ﬁne-tuning and vali-
dation of the FFS approach and (ii) to create a group
of high-level extension workers ready to go back to
ANADER to train other extension workers. The initial
group grew into eleven ‘master trainers’; half of
them returned to ANADER after the pilot, explained
the PES, after which ADR were also trained. This con-
scious focus on high-level technical agents in the agri-
cultural extension bureaucracy was linked to a deep
belief in the career professionals and their capacity
to construct new practices and rules, rather than in
the capacity of the organization per se, according to
the country manager:
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Because in this country we have – the public institutions
are very heavy – very competent human resources but
sometimes the administrative procedures can prevent
them from having the expected impact. (INT01, Abidjan,
07/06/2010)
ANADER reports that it embraced the FFS programme
because it matched their objective to move away from
the superseded ‘Training & Visit’ approach. The
success of this move was demonstrated by increas-
ingly louder criticism from the ANADER directorate
that STCP was getting all the credit for work per-
formed by ANADER agents.
Anticipating the direction of institutional reform
A third feature of the work and strategy of the PPP is
an accurate anticipation of the direction of the insti-
tutional reform set in motion during the liberalization
processes. The programme manager was determined
to link programmatically to a new but not yet func-
tional national cocoa sector-led funding mechanism.
Large multinational agro-dealers, donors, as well as
the government of Côte d’Ivoire were integrated
into the PPP right from the start. However, manage-
ment of the PPP focused mainly on interfacing with
a nascent configuration for the national funding of
agricultural professional service delivery to rural oper-
ators. In particular, the country manager and the
ANADER-seconded PES gave their support to the not
yet functional FIRCA, effectively taking a gamble on
developments, years down the line:
[FIRCA] did not ‘come from heaven’. I was aware. It was
already a process since 1999. I was part of the team
that… . If it was not at the back of my head I would
have [adopted a different strategy]. (INT04, Abidjan, 07/
06/2010)
Central to the forward-looking strategy of the PPP
was FIRCA’s mandate to organize the funding of
extension services. Constituted in 2003, FIRCA
became functional only in 2007 with limited funds.
An ANADER director explained:
FIRCA exists since 2007/2008. But it should have been
very old already. It should have been put in place
together with ANADER. […] But because everything
drags on because of the war it has cost 10 years to be
put in place. It is a political story. (INT05, Abidjan, 08/
06/2010)
The FIRCA director clariﬁes:
This will also mean that ANADER will no longer get money
automatically for cocoa; they will have to respond to a
tender just like anyone else. (INT06, ANADER, 08/06/2010)
FIRCA evolved in the middle of a political storm,
especially until 2008. During this period, the cocoa
sector was provisionally managed by CGFCC, an
interim cocoa and coffee marketing board, dethroning
duplicitous older institutions (Gbagbo, 2008b; Yapo,
2010), and CNS, an interim consultative body to
ensure proper representation of the agricultural
sector operators and guarantee the moral and stability
of the coffee and cocoa sectors (Gbagbo, 2008a).The
government had limited inﬂuence over technical
decisions made in CGFCC and CNS. However, CGFCC
still allocated some government funds directly to
FIRCA – contrary to the situation with other crops
where sector-led saving mechanisms emerged.
The management of PPP made an effort to get
the sector’s buy-in, particularly of FIRCA. It set up a
PPP steering committee and national forum with
representatives from all key actors. This committee
advised the PPP and had considerable influence over
the programme’s direction. Close relations with the
Ivorian government were cultivated, also with Presi-
dent Gbagbo. The President was introduced to the
PPP as early as 2003, and the management of STCP
appeared in joint television interviews with ANADER
and CNRA in 2005 (STCP, 2003b, 2005). The tight part-
nership with ANADER’s strategic direction and the
non-salaried affiliation of its agents were played out
during an organized high-level field visit with officials
from FIRCA, World Bank and ANADER to showcase the
FFS approach.
This political alignment encouraged FIRCA to
embrace the FFS approach, which opened the oppor-
tunity for STCP to be funded as a service provider, not
only by the old funding mechanism, for example,
Fund for the Development and Promotion of activities
of Coffee and Cocoa Producers (FDPCC) (STCP, 2004,
2006b), but also by the new funding mechanisms
that involved support from the sector operators.
These were early signs of the high potential for
scaling that encouraged the (international) private
sector in 2005 to support another phase of the
regional PPP (STCP, 2006b). The experience also mate-
rialized in a new national CGFCC cocoa programme in
2008. The new role for the PPP became to backstop
FFS programmes involving ANADER agents. In 2009,
a World Bank team wrote that any cocoa programme
in Côte d’Ivoire should include the STCP’s approach
and achievements (STCP, 2010b). In 2010, FIRCA
staff, confident of the sustainability of the mechanism,
suggested that STCP had become increasingly
superfluous.
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Keeping the private sector on board and
connecting them with the bureaucracy
Finally, STCP management made considerate efforts
to keep the private sector on board. Participation in
the PPP offered the private sector guidance and
opportunity for experimentation on how to connect
with groups in the bureaucracy, explained the STCP
manager. Specific projects in collaboration with the
private sector were set up, and much work focused
on integrating bureaucratic career professionals from
different institutions into FFS activities. Working with
a functional merit-based cell of bureaucratic pro-
fessionals did much to ‘teach’ the private sector how
to successfully engage with the cocoa bureaucracy,
especially after the reform.
The PPP particularly included multinational agro-
dealers that entered the national market around
2000. In 1999, the World Bank and IMF induced liberal-
ization and institutional reform of the entire cocoa
sector. This policy gave more influence to private
operators at the expense of government bodies and
the political elites.
Initially not much confidence existed between the
private and public sectors. Within the PPP, this was
exemplified – according to the country manager –
by a high-level MARS Inc. representative in 2003
plainly pointing out that, to their knowledge, no
organization existed in Côte d’Ivoire to properly
implement any extension activity at a large scale.
There was a strong call to work instead with NGOs.
The PPP’s management resisted this pressure and con-
tinued to focus on ANADER and a national scaling
mechanism as the best outcome of the reform
process. Even though political resistance caused long
delays, the PPP increasingly adopted a focus on build-
ing effective alliances between private sector oper-
ators and the bureaucratic career professionals.
The work of the partnership altered relationships
between the private and public sectors. By 2010, for
example, MARS Inc. had changed its beliefs, as can
be read on its corporate blog (Morgan, 2010):
[we have] been determined to work in collaboration with
the leadership of the Ivorian cocoa sector, because mean-
ingful change in the sector […] requires the support of
the cocoa institutions that are already in place –
especially the research structure CNRA and the extension
programme ANADER.
In this blog, the company also announced its intensi-
ﬁed and groundbreaking collaboration with
government:
While we have been engaged in a number of industry
efforts in West Africa involving the training of cocoa
farmers [STCP and CLP] – I think the signing of the
MOU betweenMars and the Côte d’Ivoire Ministry of Agri-
culture sets the stage for a new and different kind of
collaboration.
Companies were linked with the pilot programme
of cocoa FFS that the PPP implemented in collabor-
ation with ANADER. The PPP half-heartedly employed
the services of two reputed national NGOs in private
sector-funded sister projects, but the reports show
limited scaling impact. Companies requested
support for similar FFS programmes. Archer Daniels
Midland was the first one (STCP, 2005) and soon
other companies followed, all incorporating ANADER
agents. This movement was amplified by the ‘Harkin-
Engel Protocol’ (CMA, 2001) on the eradication of
the worst forms of child labour in 2001, which raised
pressure from consumers and caused the industry to
focus on farmers’ training. A representative of
ANADER understood the shift in the private sector as
follows:
They feel the outside pressure to do something in return
for the farmers. That is why they contact us. (INT05,
Abidjan, 08/06/2010)
FIRCA guided government agencies such as
ANADER to develop their own agenda outlining priori-
ties for the sector. In 2008, the Ivorian national cocoa
programme ‘2QC’ started, which took inspiration
from the PPP’s achievements. The CGFCC actively
invited multinationals to discuss the alignment of pro-
grammes. Without relinquishing any control over
funds and thereby effectively still bypassing the
national funding mechanism, multinationals increased
collaboration with ANADER, CNRA and CGFCC (later
CCC); this led to the much-desired opportunities for
substantial scaling of impact and cost reduction
opportunities for FFS (Muilerman & David, 2011). By
2011, the PPP was increasingly left out of these nego-
tiations and agreements. The country manager
explains this as success:
If they keep on coming to you, then your project is not
sustainable. (INT04, Abidjan, 07/06/2010)
Discussion
As a PPP, the STCP developed a substantial regional
cocoa FFS programme in four West African countries.
The case study of the functioning of the partnership
in Côte d’Ivoire and the resulting scaling of FFS
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opens a discussion on how to explain this remarkable
achievement, especially because of the difficult and
unpredictable circumstances in the country and the
cocoa sector. FFS is generally considered an effective
and attractive mode of service delivery, although it
is resource-intensive and therefore difficult to scale
(David, 2007). Hence, the quality of the intervention
cannot be credited for the scaling outcome observed
in Côte d’Ivoire. Explaining the achieved scale by the
design properties of the FFS programme itself seems
to contradict the substantially smaller scale realized
by sister cocoa FFS programmes in neighbouring
countries in West Africa with a similar design (Muiler-
man, Vellema, Schut, & Leeuwis, 2016).
The analysis in this paper shifts attention from the
nature of FFS to the nature of managed interactions of
the programme with the cocoa bureaucracy within a
particular institutional context. These interactions
stimulated and even catalysed the shift to a new
form of extension services. The interactions between
the pockets in the cocoa bureaucracy, the partnership
and the intervention programme were purposefully
constructed and managed. The country manager,
with a long history in the cocoa sector, combined
technical and political skills while navigating through
a reality of corruption, patronage, inflexibility and
unresponsiveness, resembling the work of the
‘tecnico’ described by Grindle (1977).
The situated action and the constant efforts of the
country manager to embed the PPP in specific groups
in the cocoa bureaucracy can be understood as ‘insti-
tutional work’, as conceptualized by Lawrence et al.
(2009). They understand institutional work as the pur-
poseful practices of professionals (in organizations)
aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting insti-
tutions. The insight gained from this case study is
that institutional work of this kind is a pre-condition
for scaling an intervention or, more specifically, a
new form of service delivery.
The PPP’s management succeeded to embed the
FFS approach into a bureaucratic ‘pocket of effective-
ness’ (Bierschenk, 2010; Bierschenk & de Sardan, 2014;
Roll, 2011). Roll (2014) describes the concept of a
pocket of effectiveness as relatively effective public
service delivery within a context and environment in
which this is the exception rather than the norm.
This, of course, does not necessarily mean that these
bureaucratic professionals are model citizens. Also,
the term ‘bureaucratic’ needs to be understood inclu-
sively as anyone professionally engaged in delivering
public services based on certain competencies,
regardless of the contractual arrangement. Hence,
also STCP’s management and particularly the
country manager are part and parcel of the pockets
of effectiveness.
Analysis of the scaling of FFS in Côte d’Ivoire shows
how an intervention programme consistently aligned
with a pocket of career professionals. This pocket,
with a long track record in the cocoa sector, teamed
up with the PPP and the private sector to make
service delivery work. Crook (2010) relates the high
levels of delivery of public services in Côte d’Ivoire
until the late 1990s to both the existence of a clear
mandate by the political elite and to the performance
of bureaucratic career professionals in organizational
‘islands of effectiveness’, similar to Roll’s concept of
‘pockets’. This ‘guild’ of career professionals – as we
could call it – seems to have survived the turbulent
period during which the partnership implemented
the FFS programme (2001–2011).
The evolving presence of the PPP in Côte d’Ivoire
includes a selection of intentional and serendipitous
generative and enabling practices through which the
PPP management embedded the FFS intervention in
the work and procedures of these persistent groups
of bureaucrats. Following Roll (2014), alignments
with these groups create the institutional conditions
that explain the difference in performance and
scaling among the countries where the STCP pro-
gramme was active. Though this interaction did not
emerge in Cameroon and Ghana (Muilerman,
Vellema, Schut, et al., 2016), Nigeria showed similar
productive interactions with ‘pockets’, but here, the
federal governance system meant a slower State-by-
State scaling outcome (Muilerman, Vellema, & Dietz,
2016). The deliberate making of connections with per-
sistent cocoa bureaucrats enabled the partnership to
actively navigate the violent Ivorian torrent of socio-
political events and anchor its service delivery model
in an ongoing process of institutional reform.
Studies of African states stress the dysfunctional
nature of the post-colonial state and propose an
almost deterministic political view on the functioning
or failure of the state (e.g. Anders, 2010; Chirot, 2006).
The discussion in this paper makes it relevant to relate
the obvious symptoms of state failure and predatory
behaviour to exploring what elements or groups in
the state have a more developmental agenda. Follow-
ing Evans (1995), these groups are essential for under-
standing emerging functional interactions between
public and private sectors. The case study describes
how the partnership generated conditions under
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which the private sector was able to engage with
specific groups within the bureaucracy. The interven-
tion programme brokered connections to persistent
bureaucrats with a long-standing career and pro-
fessional network in the cocoa sector. The approach
attempted to use formal competence and problem-
solving capacities, rather than clientelistic ties or tra-
ditional loyalties, as a requirement for entry into the
network (cf. Evans, 1995).
The case study accentuates the analysis of Crook
(2010) of the state in Côte d’Ivoire. He argues that
public services are not overstaffed or lavishly over-
resourced. Instead, the public services will be able to
do a good job if, in this case, a PPP constructs and
legitimizes a public funding mechanism (FIRCA),
builds collaborative organizational cultures and
encourages staff with the capacity to make a differ-
ence at local and even regional levels.
Conclusions
The scaling of induced and novel modes of service
delivery needs to be understood as an emergent
outcome of the interaction between an intervention
programme and the institutional realities in public
and private realms. The reported scale of service deliv-
ery via FFS realized by a public partnership in the tur-
bulent cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire can be explained
by the institutional work done by the PPP’s manage-
ment connecting an intervention programme to
specific groups of career professionals within the
state’s bureaucracy. These purposeful actions silenced,
to some extent, those mechanisms obstructing effec-
tive service delivery which were also present in the
violent and conflictual cocoa sector and society in
Côte d’Ivoire.
These insights propose to strengthen the growing
interest in research tracing the precise processes of
embedding interventions in both the public and
private sectors, without perceiving the state and
business as communicating vessels. Analyses and
assessments of endeavours aimed to enhance the sus-
tainability of international commodity chains, such as
the introduction of standards and the accompanying
training and service delivery models, need to look
beyond the intrinsic qualities of these interventions
for explaining under what conditions scale is achieved.
The paper proposes further development of the inter-
est in the competences and capacities of partnership
managers, bureaucrats and business leaders to con-
struct effective spaces for problem-solving. This
agenda implies the support of natural experiments
and evolving collaborations that target the making
of institutions situated in unconducive contexts.
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